The Wages Of Their Virtue

… All friends shall taste
The wages of their virtue, and all foes
The cup of their deservings. 
King Lear 
Act V, iii

Man was matter, that was Snowden’s secret.


“Take the cover off it next time” South African golfer Rory Sabbatini was saying about my player’s poorly-struck—and short—tee shot, in one of the few sentences he uttered that morning without swearing. Our journey around Tiburon, where we were for the pro-am portion of the Shark Shootout, was not merely a round of golf. It was a journey into the mind of Rory Sabbatini, and our jolly lark—not entirely unlike Marlow’s whimsical journey to see Kurtz—was accompanied by an outpouring of profanity like the drumbeat of rain on a tin roof. Which  sounds boring, but while swearing in and of itself is dull, Sabattini is anything but. Not only does he stand as a living challenge to the contemporary notion that golf is best played by beta-blocking androids, but he also demonstrates just what  Jaime Dimon, the CEO of JP Morgan, might have in common with Edward Snowden, filcher of classified information.

First though the classic opening gambit of the defense: smearing the client. Sabbatini is, after all, the very antithesis of the bland, cookie-cutter pro athlete. He’s been called the jerk of the PGA Tour, and for reason: the list of his offenses against consensus standards is, by the measure of pro golf, lengthy. At Riviera once, for instance, he berated a 16 year-old volunteer—for marking his drive with a pop can. Another time, he got into an “altercation” with Sean O’Hair for something (nobody would say what) on course. And that isn’t even to describe the blowup with Ben Crane several years ago. Even on our day with him, he complained on reaching the driving range that they’d spelled his name wrong: they had, but even so it was hard not to dislike the tone of Rory’s voice when he mentioned it.

By this time, of course, you will be thinking some version of “here we go, another narcissistic athlete,” and perhaps you would be right. The standard story that we have about athletes is that they are mollycoddled to a degree nearly unfathomable to other people: easy courses at college being the classic example, though if some stories are true that is far from the depths to which some schools will go. And it hardly stops there: there’s much to suggest that there’s very little that can’t be forgiven of a star athlete, even horrifying crimes. That’s not to suggest Sabbatini is guilty of any thing like that, but it is to say that the standards of behavior for athletes are a great deal laxer than they are for other people.

The question is, why is that? A related question, if it is not the same question, is, why do these people make so much money? And the answer to both is the same, an answer whose obviousness can only be delivered by way of an obscure quotation from long ago: it’s because of the ability of professional sports, as Leonard Koppett put it in the New York Times in 1976, “to generate money.” There’s a lot of money in sports, nearly all of which is generated solely by the skills of the players. As the generators of wealth, then, it seems right that athletes should get some proportion of it.

Now, just what that proportion is can vary by era: Koppett observes that while in 1929 players were getting around 35 percent of major league baseball’s revenue, by 1950 that had fallen to about 22 percent. These days, according to a piece in Grantland about the NHL lockout a few years ago, players in the major sports (baseball, basketball, football and, more distantly, hockey) get about 5o percent of each league’s revenue—the lockouts of recent years have mostly been about rolling back the gains of the previous decades by some percentage points. The history of sports, in other words, is largely a matter of bickering about that percentage; lately the players have largely been winning that argument. It’s the age-old argument between capital and labor: without the players, there aren’t any sports, but without the stadiums, the leagues, the television contracts and so on the players don’t have anywhere to exhibit their skills.

At least in the case of sports, a fifty-fifty split seems pretty fair: the skills athletes have are more or less demonstrable using both advanced statistical measures and the evidence displayed directly under the microscope of millions of eyeballs during a season. It’s such a successful argument, in fact, that it has apparently been adopted by realms where the contribution of (what might seem strange in this context to call) labor is not nearly so transparent to the overall success of the enterprise: the matter of the rising salaries of corporate leaders, or what Harvard magazine calls “the pay problem.”

According to Fortune, in 2006, when Congressman Barney Frank of Massachusetts held hearings on the matter of the salaries of American CEOs, a compensation consultant named Fred Cook “stepped forward to defend his clients.” As defenses go it turned out to be singularly ineffective. What Cook claimed was that, although some (outrageous!) methodologies generated a ratio of CEO salaries to the pay of workers as about 400 to one, his own, correct (and much more conservative) measure found that ratio, for the year 2004, only to be … (wait for it) … about 187 to one. To say that is a less-than rousing cover for CEO pay is perhaps like noting the Titanic still hasn’t made it to dock.

In any case, regardless of how that ratio is found, what nobody argues about is that it used to be a lot less: “In 1965,” James Surowiecki of the New Yorker in October of this year, “C.E.O.s at big companies earned, on average, about twenty times as much as their typical employee.” Surowiecki cites a study by the Economic Policy Institute that found that, between 1978 and 2011, executive compensation “rose eight hundred and seventy-six per cent.” Not only that, but as Jay Lorsch and Rakesh Khurana, professors at the Harvard Business School, noted in 2010 in Harvard magazine, “What cannot be disputed is that American CEOs make more money than CEOs in other countries.” This, at a time when the pay of American workers has more or less arguably been stagnating since about 1973.

Yet that point about American CEO pay being higher than that of other countries’ CEOs raises precisely the connection to athletes’ pay: the authors’ of the Harvard piece—both professors at the Harvard Business School—observe that the difference between that of American CEOs and that of their international counterparts is largely made up of what are known as “incentives,” generally in the form of stocks and options. “The underlying assumption” of American companies when it comes to how they pay their CEOs, they say, is that “executives would work more effectively if their monetary rewards were tied to the results they were achieving”—just as athletes are, more or less, paid with how they perform on the field. And, therefore, since American companies have been among the most successful companies in the world—the Dow Jones Industrial Average, for example, has increased something like ten times its 1980 value—it’s only right that American CEOs should be paid so much.

There is a small problem though. As Lorsch and Khurana further pointed out in Harvard: “very often executives have little or no control over the results they are supposedly being rewarded for achieving.” In other words, you can tell when your shortstop hits a triple—but it’s slightly more difficult to determine if it was your CEO’s doing when sales rose by 3.6 percent in the last quarter. Even in sports, at least team sports—and can business ever really be an individual one?—it’s difficult to tease out the contribution of an individual player to the overall fortunes; that’s one question that the statistical analysis of sport (sabermetrics) has, over the past generation, attempted to solve … but even if one can get some kind of approximation it’s never absolutely definitive.

And if you aren’t feeling as detached as Lorsch and Khurana you might have something stronger to say about this system. A report for the Institute for Policy Studies, for example, denounced American CEO pay as “a pay system that encourages high-risk behavior and lawbreaking at the expense of taxpayers and investors.” Because CEOs are rewarded for jacking up the stock price, goes this line of argument, they aren’t as concerned as they ought to be about long-term sustainability—just as, say, athletes are sometimes accused of putting their own stats ahead of the team’s winning percentage.

Maybe so or maybe not—it does demonstrate what Edward Snowden has in common with, say, with Mr. Dimon (who got $23 million in 2011, when his company was put on notice that it would be prosecuted for violating securities laws.) What the man some have called a traitor has in common with pillars of American society like the CEOs of large American companies is, precisely, the logic used by his defenders—and theirs. Here, for instance, is the columnist John Cassidy at the New Yorker arguing that the former defense contractor Snowden is “a hero.” “In revealing the colossal scale of the U.S. government’s eavesdropping on Americans and other people around the world,” Cassidy writes, Snowden “has performed a great public service that more than outweighs any breach of trust he may have committed.”  The value of the service Snowden has rendered overshadows anything else. It’s a justification which isn’t remarkably far from the notion that we can overlook bad behavior from our athletes, or celebrities generally, because of the value they bring us—or that CEOs should be extravagantly paid because of the value they add to their companies.

It’s a point worth making, anyway, if you feel that tensions aren’t quite high enough at any holiday parties you might attend this season. Tell them Rory Sabbatini says hello.

Is Streamsong Real?

“Young man, the Soviet Union is our adversary. Our enemy is the Navy.”
    —General Curtis Le May

Just finding Streamsong, the new golf resort ballyhooed as the “Bandon Dunes of Florida,” is an exercise in navigation: miles from any interstate highway, it’s surrounded by what appears, alternately, to be the savannah of the Serengeti Plain or an apocalyptic post-industrial hellscape. Either a lion pack or Mad Max appear likely to wait around the next turn. It’s a Florida unknown to the tourists on either coast—but Streamsong exists where the real map of Florida is being drawn, where the real history of the state is being written. That, even if one of Florida’s major exports is a denial that history exists, and the resort’s operations may in one sense dispute the very idea of maps.

Streamsong is located in the central part of Florida, far from the tourist beaches; there are no other big-time golf courses in the area. It consists, so far, of two 18-hole golf courses, the Red and the Blue. The Red was designed by Tom Doak’s Renaissance Design team, and the Blue by the partnership of Bill Coore and Ben Crenshaw, the Masters winner who is a connoisseur of golf course design. Both teams are grouped together as part of golf’s “minimalist” design movement; according to Renaissance Design, the “minimalist’s objective is to route as many holes as possible whose main features already exist in the landscape.” The landscape at Streamsong, however, that faced the two architectural teams was by no means natural.

This part of Florida is the preserve of enormous cattle ranches and massive phosphate mining operations. They’re industries that don’t often make it into the tourist brochures. Yet as dependent as Florida is on tourism—and at least some of it is definitely golf-related—Streamsong is the result of changes in the second of those industries. And, as it happens, it’s mining that’s at the center of a debate over the future of the state itself, as reported in the Tampa Bay Times in 2010.

Phosphate mining is, according to the director of the Tampa Port Authority Richard Wainio, “a singular industry … Florida doesn’t have a lot of big industries, and this is at or near the top of the pile as far as economic benefit for the state.” The phosphate industry, which ships its product through Tampa Bay, is in other words the economic machinery that the gloss of Disney World and South Beach obscures. Most of the state’s visitors, and likely by far the majority of its citizens, have little notion of what phosphate mining is nor how it can affect their lives. A little backstory might be in order then.

It begins somewhere around 50 million years ago, during the Eocene era—when the piece of Africa that would become Florida broke away from its parent plate and attached itself to the North American plate during the event that shattered the super-continent Pangea. In the eons since, shallow seas rose and fell over the rock, depositing the fossils that, when they were discovered in the 19th century, led to the central part of the state to be called “Bone Valley.” Animal bones and teeth concentrate phosphorus, as does the existence of animal life generally: phosphorus contains a lot of energy within its chemical bonds, which makes it necessary for nearly all life on earth—and thus, valuable.

“Bone Valley” is drained by the Peace River, which rises near the town of Bartow, the nearest larg(ish) town to Streamsong. A report by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on the river—done because the Corps manages the slow-flowing “river of grass” called the Everglades—not long ago held that “phosphate mining had led to the loss of 343 miles of streams and 136,000 acres of wetlands in the Peace River region.” That finding was a major piece of the evidence introduced by the enemies of phosphate mining in their lawsuit.

The largest company to mine phosphates in the Bone Valley is a company called Mosaic, a behemoth corporation formed out from a merger of two predecessors: IMC Global and the crop nutrition department of Cargill, each of them massive companies in their own right. Mosaic “is the largest producer of finished phosphate products, with an annual capacity greater than the next two producers combined.” If any one company has contributed to the degradation of the Peace River, then Mosaic—whose corporate forebears have operated in the Peace River watershed since before 1909—is the primary suspect. And Mosaic is, also, the owner of Streamsong—despite being such a large company, the resort is the company’s first foray into golf, or anything like tourism at all.

It’s an odd kind of timing, of course, since the numbers of golf courses in the United States are declining, not rising these days. Golf is an industry that took a major hit during the recent economic troubles: “Over the past decade,” said the New York Times in 2008, “the leisure activity most closely associated with corporate success in America has been in a kind of recession.” Nevertheless, Mosaic went ahead and built two courses by top-name design teams at just the time many courses in the United States were shutting down. Just what that timing may, or may not, have to do with a lawsuit filed in 2010 by environmental groups, including the Sierra Club, seeking to limit phosphate mining is unclear.

If building Streamsong is a tactical exercise meant to further a long-term corporate goal—and there’s no knowing at the moment if it is—then it’s well-within a Florida tradition of commercial strategy. European intellectuals, for instance, have long noted that Florida is, perhaps even more than California, known as a place with a tenuous connection to reality: the homeland of what the sophisticated Europeans call “hyperreality,” a place where signs no longer refer to an external “reality.” Where, in fact, the difference between signs and their referents no longer exists.

One such thinker, the Frenchman Jean Baudrillard, conjured up the Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges’ fable, “On Rigor In Science,” to describe Disneyland. Borges’ short, one-paragraph tale describes an imperial society so wedded to precision that nothing less than “a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire” would do. In such a place, the difference between a place and its representation would break down; so too, Baudrillard argues, are the Disney parks “perfect model[s] of all the entangled orders of simulation.” Another such Florida place, which as it happens was the starting point for my own trip to Streamsong, was that seemingly-dull “retirement community” (as they’re called), “the Villages.”

According to one resident, the Villages are “one of the places the Spanish looked for the Fountain of Youth.” But where Ponce de Leon left empty-handed, the new residents of the place are more fortunate: “‘we found it!’” Just how the Villages found this “Fountain of Youth” is something that the Mosaic Company might do well to examine. Assuming, to be sure, that it hasn’t already.

The real history of the Villages is that they began as a way to sell Florida swampland in the Lady Lake area of the state when the previous way of selling it—mail order—was outlawed by federal law in 1968. (Because it lent itself to fraud so easily, obviously.) Partners Harold Schwartz—significantly, a former Chicago advertising executive—and Al Tarrson’s attempts to develop the land as a mobile home park throughout the 1970s largely failed until in 1983 Schwartz bought out Tarrson and brought his son, H. Gary Morse (also a Chicago ad man), on to run the company. Morse’s idea was to re-aim their company towards a higher-income bracket than potential mobile-home owners; the master-stroke was building a golf course and not charging greens fees to play it. Tens of thousands of residents followed.

That isn’t, obviously, the history that the resident who talks about Ponce de Leon refers to when he mentions the Fountain of Youth. THAT history, it seems, comes from another source: according to a story from the St. Petersburg Times in 2000, “the Morse family (with the help of a bottle of Scotch and a case of beer) concocted a ‘fanciful history’” of the Villages; complete, in fact, with a reference to a tale of a visit from Ponce de Leon himself. The reason for this fabricated history is simple enough: as Gary Morse himself told the St. Petersburg Times reporter, “We wanted a town to remind them of their youth.”

Yet while the original “town center” development in the Villages—“Spanish Springs”— began the idea concocting “history” out of whole cloth, it’s the newest,—“Lake Sumter Landing”—that sails to a farther shore. “It features,” one Timothy Burke, a student at the University of South Florida notes in his paper, “An Economy of Historicity: The Carefully-Crafted Heritage of the Villages,” “no fewer than 76 ‘historic’ locations”—despite the fact that many of these sites “hadn’t existed six months prior.” Nearly every shop in the shopping district has a plaque adverting the building’s antiquity, complete with some tale or other of a previous tenant or notable: as Umberto Eco, author of “Travels in Hyperreality,” might say, Lake Sumter Landing “blends the reality of trade with the play of fiction.” So, the local movie theater not only claims to be an old vaudeville palace, it asserts that a traveling magician once “threw a playing card from the stage at the ceiling of the theater so hard that the card lodged in a crack in the plaster—where it remains to this day.” The top? Yeah, we’re over it.

Still, the idea behind the plaques isn’t just for entertainment value. Reading these plaques, nearly all of which refer to how the “original” inhabitants of the place arrived there from somewhere else—as, perhaps not coincidentally, do the current residents. It’s one way that, as Burke says, “the stories contributed to their adaptation of the Villages as a ‘home’”: the fictional characters described in the fictional histories inevitably come from places like Maine or New York, not Alabama or Tennessee. So, for instance, the fictional Upton family, proprietors of the eponymous Feed and Tack Store—“now” a restaurant—came to Lake Sumter from Pennsylvania. Almost certainly, the meaning of these varied origins is meant to reflect the varied origins of the current residents: the former Nebraska businessmen or Cleveland dentists who chose to spend the rest of their lives there. The “fanciful history,” in other words, allows each new resident to imagine themselves already having “roots” in what is, in reality, a landscape almost wholly ignorant of what actually preceded it.

Burke interviews one resident, for instance, about the fictional history, and asks whether “she felt there was an authentic heritage to the Lady Lake area that was being overlooked” by the fictional history of Spanish Springs and Lake Sumter Landing. “‘Oh,’” the former New Jersey schoolteacher says, “‘but this is Florida. It probably wasn’t the nicest history.’” Perhaps so: actual local historians, Burke says, report that before the “northern invasion” of the Chicago advertising executives, “the Lady Lake area was ruled by cattle baron Clyde Bailey”—who, given the history of the cattle industry in America, was presumably not a Boy Scout.

Assuming though that we can juggle the distinction between “real” and “fake” on top of “nice” and “not nice”—a pretty complex mental operation—maybe we can presume that—though the “fake” history of Lake Sumter Landing is likely “nicer” than the “real” history of Clyde Bailey’s Lady Lake—it doesn’t necessarily mean that the real history of the Villages is all that much different from that of Lady Lake. Like the old-time robber barons of a company town, Gary Morse owns “all or part of pretty much everything worth owning in the Villages, including the bank, the hospital, the utilities, the garbage collection company, the TV and radio stations, and the newspaper,” according to a story in Slate. But not merely that—which is what got Morse in trouble with the IRS recently.

This summer, the IRS ruled that government bonds issued by the Villages’ governing board—called a community development district, or CDD—“did not deserve to be tax-exempt” like other bonds issued by CDDs throughout Florida. Why? “Because,” as Slate said, “everyone who sits on the district board—like everything else in the Villages—is controlled by Morse.” Or as the New York Times reported: “the IRS states that the district does not function like a true government.” An actual government, for example, is usually worried about what its voters might think about how that government spends its money.

That’s why IRS agent Dominick Servadio questioned “why the Village Center Community District used $60 million in bond proceeds to buy guardhouses, golf courses, and small parks that cost Mr. Morse … less than $8 million to build,” according to the Times. “‘If I was a resident of The Villages,’” Mr. Servadio wrote, “‘I would be outraged by this transaction.’” The Villages, it seems, has responded by saying that Mr. Servadio is not nice: “‘It’s really been upsetting the residents,’” the Times quotes Janet Tutt, district manager for the Villages, “‘to deal with the stress and anxiety.’” One imagines that yes, there is likely some stress involved when discovering that one’s government has been swindled for a 700 percent profit—but just where that blame lies is perhaps not so clear-cut as Ms. Tutt might say.

None of this, to be sure, has anything directly to do with Streamsong which, so far as I know, does not pretend to have always been there. It is true that a golf course—particularly one built in Florida, which was unaffected by the Ice Ages—is always a kind of fakery, because despite what Tom Doak might claim no golf course simply takes the land it’s built on as is: “All over the world,” says geologist Anita Harris in John McPhee’s Annals of the Former World, “when people make golf courses they are copying glacial landscapes.” Yet fairly obviously, the resort wasn’t built simply because the company felt that its land demanded a golf course to be put upon it, in the way that some say that the sea by Monterey, California demanded Pebble Beach be built. Almost certainly, the company expects some return for its investment: a return that may or may not have any reference to the Sierra Club’s lawsuit.

Yet even were there some “plot” involved in the building of Streamsong, the judgement of whether it actually signifies something “nefarious” or not ultimately comes down to what value you place on phosphate mining generally. As it happens, phosphates are part of all living things: it’s an essential nutrient for plants, for instance, and necessary for nearly all metabolic processes in animals. Phosphates also allow muscles to store energy for immediate use, and they build our teeth and bones. This is not even to address industrial uses—without phosphate mining, in short, a great deal of the contemporary world, “natural” and “artificial,” falls apart.

Countering those points, the Sierra Club notes what opponents of mining always note: that the benefits of mining rarely accrue to those living near the site of the mine. Sixty percent of the ore shipped out of Florida, for example, leaves the United States—historically, mostly to China—and while the mining industry provides some jobs, those numbers are dwarfed by the numbers of jobs in Florida that depend on a clean Peace River watershed, including the hundreds of thousands that drink Peace River water. As with nearly all mining operations, phosphate mining leaves behind it a cleanup trail—and in the case of Florida, that includes small amounts of radioactive uranium that will likely outlast even the corporations that do the mining, much less any of us human beings alive today.

To which Jean Baudrillard, for one, might reply “Just so.” Already, in 1975, the French intellectual had published “Simulacra and Simulations,” which argued that, today, the distinction between the Real and the Imaginary had fallen: in his words, the “territory no longer precedes the map.” “Disneyland,” he says, “is presented as imaginary in order to make us believe that the rest is real, when in fact Los Angeles and the America surrounding it are no longer real.” Or, to put it in a way that might be more applicable to those residents of the Villages who appear quite ready to believe that the place was built by Santa Claus, Disneyland “is meant to be an infantile world, in order to make us believe the adults are elsewhere, in the ‘real’ world, and to conceal the fact that childishness is everywhere.” Is Streamsong a cover for iniquitous business practices, or an attempt at an “enlightened” capitalism that recognizes the (alas, completely necessary) damage it does?

Or, to put it another way: Is Streamsong Real?